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Abstract 
The article will ask whether Sino-Indian strategic competition in the Indian Ocean 
should be properly understood through the lens of a security dilemma.  It examines 
the strategic positions of India and China in the Indian Ocean and concludes that India 
has an overwhelming strategic advantage that China cannot realistically mitigate in the 
foreseeable future.  This advantage precludes any real security dilemma arising 
between them.  In fact, both China and India have good reasons to keep strategic 
competition under control while they each broaden their regional influence. 
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 Beyond the String of Pearls:  
Is there really a Sino-Indian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean? 
 
China is becoming an ever more important factor in the strategic balance of the Indian 
Ocean and is increasing cutting across India’s strategic ambitions in the region.   Many 
commentators see China as aggressively expanding its influence in the Indian Ocean as 
a prelude to building a significant military presence.   According to this narrative, 
China’s offensive actions are creating a security dilemma for India and others that 
could lead to naval rivalry and an arms race in the region.       
 
This article will look at the concept of the security dilemma before examining whether 
such a dilemma exists in the Indian Ocean.  It will discuss India’s strategic position and 
then examine China’s strategic imperatives and vulnerabilities in the region.  The 
article will conclude that India’s overwhelming strategic advantages in the Indian 
Ocean preclude any real security dilemma arising.  In fact, it is in the interests of both 
China and India to act cautiously and mitigate rivalry in the maritime sphere. 
 
What is a Security Dilemma? 
 
The security dilemma forms a basic part of our thinking about international relations.  
The idea was first articulated by the international relations scholar John H. Herz, who 
observed that attempts by states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of 
intention, to increase insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as 
defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening (Herz, 1950).  This idea 
holds an important position in several different traditions in international relations 
thinking, if in somewhat different ways.   So-called offensive realists such as John 
Mearsheimer argue that the security dilemma is inescapable because anarchy 
encourages all states to always increase their own power at the expense of others 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). Defensive realists such as Stephen Walt claim that a security 
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dilemma will arise in some circumstances because states will always try to maximise 
their own security and are distrustful of other states' intentions (Walt, 1987).  
Constructivists such as Alexander Wendt focus on the subjective element, arguing that 
security dilemmas arise due to intersubjective understandings where states assume 
the worst about each other's intentions (Wendt, 1992, p.397).   
 
But if a security dilemma can arise due to state behaviour or perceptions why is it 
more intense in some circumstances than others? Robert Jervis sets out four simple 
scenarios to describe conditions under which a security dilemma will arise in differing 
degrees.  According to Jervis, the key to understanding the intensity of the security 
dilemma is how easily it is for others to distinguish between offensive and defensive 
behaviour and the relative advantage of offense and defence in the given 
circumstances (Jervis, 1978).  These scenarios are:  first, when offensive and defensive 
behaviour are not distinguishable but offense has a strategic advantage, then the 
environment is ‘doubly dangerous’ and the security dilemma is very intense. Status 
quo states will behave in an aggressive manner and the possibility of an arms race will 
arise; second, where offensive and defensive behaviour are not distinguishable but 
defense has a strategic advantage, then the security dilemma will be intense. In this 
situation, a state might be able to increase its security without being a threat to other 
states and without endangering the security of other states; third, where offensive and 
defensive behaviour are distinguishable but offense has a strategic advantage, then 
the security dilemma is not intense. Though the environment is relative safe, offensive 
behaviour has an advantage which might result in aggression at some future time; and 
fourth, where offensive and defensive behaviour are distinguishable and defense has a 
strategic advantage, the environment is ‘doubly safe’ and the security dilemma has 
little or no intensity.  According to Jervis, a state might build its military capability for 
defensive purposes which other states might interpret as offensive; this may result in 
those other states taking an aggressive stance, which in turn may lead to an arms race.  
The security dilemma might also force states to form new alliances especially if it is 
perceived that offensive behaviour holds a strategic advantage over defence.    
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 How might these concepts apply to India and China in the Indian Ocean? There is 
considerable strategic competition or even rivalry between India and China in several 
dimensions and theatres, including on their Himalayan border, in relation to Pakistan 
and elsewhere in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean.  Many analysts claim that a Sino-
Indian security dilemma exists or is arising in the Indian Ocean (Garver, 2002; Athwal, 
2008; Holslag, 2009; Mohan, 2012).  The idea has even become part of political 
rhetoric, when, for example, political leaders talk of a ‘Malacca Dilemma’ or a ‘Hormuz 
Dilemma’ to describe the vulnerability of their sea lines of communication across the 
Indian Ocean.  The popular ‘String of Pearls’ narrative also reflects these perceptions.  
It posits that China’s interests in various port and other infrastructure projects in the 
Indian Ocean region are strategic in nature, creating a potential threat for India.  This 
article will look at Chinese and Indian strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean and the 
String of Pearls narrative before returning to the question of a security dilemma. 
 
India’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean region 
 
The great triangle of Indian subcontinent jutting south from Eurasia geographically 
dominates the Indian Ocean.  India is the predominant power in the subcontinent and 
in turn is the most powerful littoral state in the Indian Ocean region.   But although 
much of its borders are oceanic, Indian strategic thinking has historically had a strong 
continental outlook. Military threats to India have long been perceived as coming over 
land.  Indian maritime strategists, led by the Indian Navy, are now seeking to expand 
the Indian ‘mental map’ to give the maritime realm greater priority.  State-based 
maritime security threats to India’s continental territory are seen as relatively unlikely, 
although maritime based terrorism has become a significant concern.  Indian maritime 
security concerns are now primarily focused on the protection of trade, India’s 
exclusive economic zone and, more broadly, on the extension of Indian strategic 
influence in the region. 
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India has long had ambitions to be the dominant power in the Indian Ocean.   Though 
few might publicly admit it, many in New Delhi believe that the Indian Ocean must be, 
and must be seen to be, ‘India’s Ocean’ (Scott, 2006).  As one US analyst commented, 
‘New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it both natural and 
desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant influence 
in this region—the world's only region and ocean named after a single state’ (Berlin, 
2006).  This aspiration brings together several strands of Indian strategic thinking: 
some argue that India must establish a defence perimeter in the Indian Ocean to 
preclude the possibility of extra-regional intervention in the subcontinent; some draw 
a connection between India’s maritime ambitions and its aspirations to become a great 
power.  Indeed influential strategists such as K.Subrahmanyam have argued that 
leadership of the Indian Ocean is part of India’s ‘manifest destiny’ (Holmes, Winner 
and Yoshihara, 2009, p.38).1  Not least is also a dose of nominative determinism.  As 
Indian Ambassador to the United States, Ronan Sen, told President George Bush in 
2005, ‘There are good reasons why it is called the Indian Ocean ... it has always been in 
the Indian sphere of influence’ (Rajghatta, 2005).  These aspirations to strategic 
leadership are reflected in recent claims by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
that henceforth India should be regarded as a ‘net security provider’ to its region 
(Kumar, 2013). 
 
In line with its aspirations, India is building its capabilities in the Indian Ocean.  Over 
the last decade or so there has been a dramatic increase in India’s defence 
expenditure which has transformed the Indian Navy into a blue water navy that can 
project power throughout much of the Indian Ocean.  The Indian Navy has expansion 
plans over the next decade or so, involving a fleet of over 160 ships by 2022, including 
three aircraft carriers and 60 major combatant ships, as well as almost 400 naval 
aircraft (India Defence, 2008).   India is also in the process of developing new military 
partnerships that will enhance its strategic reach, including relationships with 
strategically located states such as Singapore, Maldives and Oman.   In March 2014, 
Shiv Shankar Menon, the Indian National Security Advisor, announced the 
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establishment of a new Indian Ocean maritime security grouping among India and the 
Indian Ocean island states of Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius (Dikshit, 
2014).  Menon also foreshadowed that such a grouping might be extended to or 
replicated in the Bay of Bengal.   These are significant steps for India, which its long 
tradition of non-alignment. Although the United States will likely be the predominant 
power in the Indian Ocean for some decades, there is a belief among many strategists, 
particularly in India, that India will eventually inherit the US mantle. 
 
China’s strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean 
 
China’s overwhelming strategic imperative in the Indian Ocean is the protection of its 
sea lines of communication (its so-called ‘SLOCs’) across the Indian Ocean, particularly 
the transport of energy.  Beijing is keenly aware that its SLOCs in the Indian Ocean are 
highly vulnerable to threats from state and non-state actors, especially through the 
narrow ‘chokepoints’ through which most trade must pass.  Some 40% of China’s oil 
imports transit the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance of the Persian Gulf and around 
82% of China’s oil imports transit the Malacca Strait through Southeast Asia (US 
Department of Defence, 2012, p.42).  According to Chinese President Hu Jiantao this 
last chokepoint represents China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’. Chinese strategists are 
concerned that a potential adversary may be tempted to interdict Chinese trade 
through the Malacca Strait or elsewhere in the Indian Ocean as a bargaining chip in the 
context of a wider dispute.  China currently implicitly accepts the role of the United 
States in providing maritime security in the Indian Ocean, but it takes quite a different 
view of India’s strategic aspirations.   
 
China’s growing trading and investment relations in the Indian Ocean will likely 
significantly increase China’s strategic interests in the region in coming years.  Threats 
to significant infrastructure such as pipeline infrastructure (which tend to be highly 
vulnerable to both state and non-state actors) could create significant additional 
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imperatives for a Chinese security presence.  As will be discussed later, this could 
become important factors in China’s relationships with Pakistan and Myanmar. 
 
China is addressing its strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean, especially in 
relation to its maritime SLOCs, through building capabilities to project limited naval 
and air power into the Indian Ocean and developing its economic and political 
influence with several Indian Ocean states. But it is also claimed that through the so-
called ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, China is methodically laying the groundwork for a 
Chinese naval presence in the region that could threaten the interests of India and 
others.    
 
The expansion of China’s naval capabilities 
 
China began implementing plans to develop a so-called ‘blue water’ navy in the 1980s.  
China’s maritime strategy is overwhelmingly focused on the Taiwan Strait and 
elsewhere in East Asia, but it also has long-term implications for the Indian Ocean.  
Over the last two decades or so, China has embarked on a major naval expansion 
program, including the commissioning of its first aircraft carrier and is also developing 
anti-access area denial capabilities that have the potential to change the balance of 
power in the Western Pacific (US Department of Defense, 2012).   
 
Overall China’s naval capabilities now exceed India’s by a considerable margin in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms, and that margin is likely to grow in coming years.  
But despite alarm among some Indian analysts, China’s power projection capabilities in 
the Indian Ocean are very limited and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable 
future.  The Chinese Navy (PLAN) has little experience in operating beyond coastal 
waters despite recent anti-piracy deployments to the Arabian Sea. Notwithstanding its 
expansion program, China has only a limited number of blue water naval combatants 
and few long range air strike capabilities.  China’s ability to project power into the 
Indian Ocean is highly constrained by the long distance from Chinese ports and air 
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bases (the closest Chinese naval base to the Indian Ocean is at Hainan Island in the 
South China Sea), the lack of logistical support, and the need for Chinese naval vessels 
to deploy to the Indian Ocean through chokepoints.  One review of PLAN’s out-of-area 
capabilities concluded that it cannot currently conduct a full-scale joint forcible entry 
operation, maintain maritime superiority out of area (i.e. outside of East Asia), conduct 
multicarrier or carrier strike group operations, or provide comprehensive protection 
against threats to an out of area task force (Yung et al, 2010).   According to the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, any conflict involving supply lines 
stretching further than 200 miles or which did not involve a contiguous land corridor 
would severely restrict the PLA’s ability to deploy and maintain its forces (IISS, 2011, 
p.134).   According to You Ji, an Australian expert on Chinese military affairs, Beijing 
understands that the use of military option to meet conventional threats to Indian 
Ocean SLOCs is not realistic and that military means for protecting SLOCs will be a last 
resort in Beijing’s hierarchy of choices (You, 2012). 
 
China’s first steps in projecting naval power into the Indian Ocean region have been in 
response to the piracy crisis in the Gulf of Aden.  In December 2008, following the 
hijacking of two Chinese registered ships, China deployed three warships to waters off 
Somalia to conduct antipiracy operations, only the third deployment of Chinese naval 
ships into the Indian Ocean in more than six centuries.  The PLAN has since made 
successive deployments, with vessels receiving logistical support primarily out of 
Salalah in Oman and Aden in Yemen.  China has acted relatively cautiously - before it 
deployed in the Indian Ocean, China waited to gauge the international reaction to the 
counter-piracy mission and they ensured that the deployment had the authorisation of 
both the Somali government and the United Nations (Moore, 2012).  Nevertheless, 
Chinese commentators have made much of China’s anti-piracy deployments as a 
demonstration or even ‘breakthrough point’ for China’s image as a ‘great responsible 
power’ (Yoshihara and Holmes, 2010).         
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The expansion of China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region 
 
Over the last decade or so, in line with the growth of China’s role elsewhere in the 
world, there has been a major expansion of China’s economic relationships in the 
Indian Ocean region.  In several states China is building a level of influence that rivals 
or even exceeds that of India.  But the full strategic impact of this growing influence is 
not yet clear. 
 
Pakistan has long anchored China’s strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region. 
China has established itself as a major supplier of arms to Pakistan and provides it with 
considerable diplomatic support against India.  The China factor has since played a 
major role in limiting India’s strategic options with Pakistan and keeping India 
strategically pre-occupied in South Asia.  Since the 1980s the relationship gained a new 
dimension when China facilitated the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles to 
Pakistan.  The economic relationship has also grown, and China is now Pakistan’s 
second largest trading partner.      
 
China is also developing its economic and political relationships elsewhere in South 
Asia, including with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.  Although South 
Asia is generally seen as being within India’s core sphere of influence, India’s 
dominance is not well reflected in the region’s economic relationships.   China’s 
political and economic links with Sri Lanka have become of some concern to New 
Delhi, and many in India’s security community fear that India’s influence in Sri Lanka 
will be marginalised by China. Although India remains Sri Lanka’s biggest trading 
partner, China is now its major source of infrastructure investment, including several 
controversial projects.   China’s economic influence is also growing among the small 
island states of the Indian Ocean, including Maldives and Mauritius, which have long 
had close relationships with India.     
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Much has been made of Chinese strategic penetration of Myanmar over the last few 
decades and the potential for it to be used as a base for China’s strategic ambitions in 
the Indian Ocean.   For China, Myanmar is an attractive strategic partner, potentially 
keeping India off balance in the northeast Indian Ocean, just as the China-Pakistan 
relationship creates pressure on India from the west.   The relationship is primarily 
economic but also had a significant security dimension, particularly in arms supply. But 
since 2011, a reformist government under President Thein Sein has made considerable 
steps towards improving relations with the United States and India while partly 
distancing itself from China.  These events probably represent the most significant set-
back for China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region for many years.  
 
The development of alternative transportation routes 
 
China is also developing alternative overland energy transport connections from 
southern and western China to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan and Myanmar.  One 
project involves plans to build links between the Arabian Sea and China’s western 
Xinjian province through Pakistan, which includes a proposed oil pipeline and road/rail 
links from the Chinese border to the new port of Gwadar in western Pakistan.  
However, the adverse security environment makes it unlikely that these links will be  
developed in the foreseeable future.   China has already made a small military 
deployment to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to protect Chinese road maintenance 
workers against local tribesmen and Pakistan’s Baluchistan province remains extremely 
volatile. 
 
China has made more progress in developing connections to the Indian Ocean through 
Myanmar. This is part of what Beijing has called the national bridgehead strategy of 
turning Yunnan province into a bridgehead for strategic engagement with the Indian 
Ocean, as part of its ‘Two Ocean Strategy’. According to China analyst, Sun Yun, this 
strategy is currently focussed on developing trade and transportation links between 
China and the Indian Ocean, although Chinese officials privately acknowledge that it 
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has a political and security component (Sun, 2012). The Yunnan-Yangon Irrawaddy 
road/rail/river corridor has been operational for around a decade and has allowed 
significant improvements in freight transportation times to southern China.  China has 
also recently completed oil and gas pipelines between the new port of Kyaukphyu and 
Yunnan province that will transport gas from Myanmar’s offshore gas fields as well as 
oil shipped from the Middle East.    
 
Although the Myanmar pipeline and the Gwadar pipeline (if ever built) would reduce 
the proportion of China’s energy imports that must transit the Malacca Strait, it is 
doubtful whether these projects would materially mitigate China’s strategic 
vulnerabilities, at least vis a vis India.  They would not prevent the interception of 
Chinese tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, the Arabian Sea or the Suez Canal and the 
pipelines themselves would be highly vulnerable to attack (Erickson and Collins, 2010). 
But despite the inherently defensive nature of these transport linkages, they are 
viewed with considerable suspicion by many in New Delhi as adverse to India’s 
interests.     
 
China’s ‘String of Pearls strategy’ 
 
Over the last decade or so, many analysts have claimed that China has been pursuing 
what has been called the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy in the Indian Ocean and that this 
constitutes a threat to India (Kaplan, 2013; Malik, 2011; Khurana, 2008; Karnad, 
2005).2  During that period, Chinese companies have been involved in the funding and 
construction of commercial port facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and 
Myanmar.  Although China has been careful to avoid any overt military presence or, in 
most cases, even any commercial role in the operation of these ports, some 
proponents of the String of Pearls theory claim that China has negotiated secret access 
rights to allow the PLAN to use these ports as logistics hubs or naval bases across the 
northern Indian Ocean.   
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The String of Pearls narrative has now become a prominent factor in Indian public 
debate about China’s intentions in the Indian Ocean.  Despite denials by Beijing that it 
has any intention to establish any military bases in the Indian Ocean (The Hindu, 2012),   
China’s relationships in the region are generally not perceived in the Indian security 
community as being a legitimate reflection of Chinese interests.   Rather, many 
perceive China’s regional relationships as being directed against India: either as a plan 
of maritime ‘encirclement’ or to keep India strategically off balance in the region, just 
as China’s relationship with Pakistan has long kept India off balance in South Asia 
(Maitra, 2005; Ramchandran, 2007). 
 
Through the 1990s, Chinese companies were involved in the development or 
upgrading of several ports in Myanmar on the Bay of Bengal.  China is also said to have 
provided assistance in constructing a signals intelligence facility at Myanmar’s Great 
Coco island.  This has long been the subject of controversy among the Indian security 
community, who claimed it was used by China to spy on India’s naval base at Port Blair 
in the Andaman Islands, monitor commercial traffic through the Malacca Strait and/or 
monitor Indian missile tests.  In 2005, the Myanmar regime, which had always 
emphatically denied the existence of such facilities or any Chinese military presence in 
the Coco islands, invited the Indian Navy to carry out its own inspections of the islands 
and ports, after which the Navy conceded that there was no Chinese intelligence 
facility on Great Coco Island and nor were there any Chinese naval bases anywhere in 
Myanmar (Asian Defence Journal, 2005).  As one specialist in Myanmar strategic affairs 
commented, this ‘was a remarkable about face on two issues that had preoccupied 
Indian defence planners for more than a decade’ (Selth, 2008).   
 
Another controversial symbol of China’s interests in the Indian Ocean is the port at 
Hambantota in Sri Lanka.  Chinese companies funded the development of a new port 
and an associated international airport costing around US$1 billion, which are now 
operated by Sri Lankan state entities. The location of Hambantota very close to the sea 
lanes that round the southern tips of India and Sri Lanka is taken as proof by some 
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analysts that it is a Pearl in China’s string, available for use by the PLAN.  But these 
claims are not supported by the evidence.  The Sri Lankan government first offered the 
project to India, which declined the opportunity (Vasan, 2009).3 Some Indian 
commentators see this as a major mistake, demonstrating a lack of a vision and 
assertiveness in Indian foreign policy (Raman, 2007).  But according to one Indian 
official, New Delhi did not feel the need to bid for the project given India’s interests 
elsewhere in Sri Lanka and did not see the project as reducing India’s influence 
(Ramachandran, 2007).  There were also domestic political considerations – the Indian 
states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu also have ambitions to develop the ports at Vizhinjam, 
Cochin and Tuticorin which will compete directly with Sri Lanka for the region’s 
lucrative transhipment trade.  Beyond Chinese financing of its construction there is 
little evidence to support the contention that Hambantota will one day serve as a base 
for Chinese warships.  Similarly, a recent the Chinese-funded expansion of Sri Lanka’s 
main port at Colombo has let to claims that it too will come under China’s control.  
Indeed, Colombo is already an important port for India with some 13% of India’s 
container traffic being transhipped through it, and this may rise significantly.  While 
this may be of concern to India, it appears to be essentially a commercial consequence 
of the poor quality of India’s own port infrastructure (The Economist, 2013). 
 
China’s involvement in the port of Gwadar in western Pakistan, around 600km east of 
the Strait of Hormuz, may have the most strategic significance, although perhaps not in 
the way that many assume.  Some Indian analysts argue that a Chinese military 
presence at Gwadar would create a ‘Hormuz Dilemma’ for India (through which the 
major of its total oil imports pass) analogous to China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma.’   Gwadar 
has long been seen as having strategic significance. In the 1980s, the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan was viewed (incorrectly) by Washington as the first step in 
a strategy to gain access to a ‘warm water’ port on the Indian Ocean through Gwadar.  
Gwadar has again come into the spotlight as Pakistan increases its reliance on China.   
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Gwadar, which sits on the edge of the Baluchi desert, seems an unlikely location for a 
major commercial port.  In addition to proposals to develop Gwadar as a transit 
terminal for an oil pipeline running to China, discussed previously, it is hoped that 
Gwadar can be developed into a transhipment hub for trade to the Persian Gulf (in 
competition primarily with Dubai).  But the Port of Singapore Authority, which 
previously operated the port, had no success in promoting the port for either domestic 
trade or transhipment. In 2012, a Chinese state-owned company took over operation 
of the port and reportedly committed to further investments in local infrastructure of 
some $750 million (Lahore Times, 2013).  But its intentions are unclear.  Any routes to 
western China would need to transit Baluchistan, northwest tribal areas and Pakistani 
Kashmir, all of which are in a semi-permanent state of insurgency.   A recent report 
describes the security environment in Baluchistan as, ‘spiralling out of control’ and 
having far more potential repercussions for the Pakistani federation than even the 
militancy in the Pashtun areas (IDSA, 2010).  Whether or not this is entirely accurate, it 
is clear that Baluchistan has a major long-term security problem. Chinese engineers in 
Gwadar have been attacked several times by insurgents, and an expanded Chinese 
presence in Gwadar could draw China into a broader role in combating the insurgency.  
 
Pakistan has actively promoted a Chinese presence in Gwadar.  In the wake of the 
deterioration of US-Pakistan relations after the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 
2011, the Pakistan Defence Minister, Ahmed Mukhtar, sought to play the ‘China card’, 
announcing that China would build a naval base at Gwadar.  This was immediately 
denied by Beijing and there are as yet no indications of any Chinese military presence 
(Fazl-e-Haider, 2012).4   According to one analyst, ‘Beijing is treading carefully, and 
with good reason. A combination of compelling economic, security, and political 
factors ensure that a fully functioning commercial port - let alone an operational 
military base - remains a distant prospect’ (Venugopalan, 2011).   China has reason to 
be cautious.  As noted above, China would have little wish to be sucked into Pakistan’s 
ethnic and religious conflicts in protecting military infrastructure. A Chinese military 
presence in Gwadar would likely provoke a significant reaction from both the United 
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States and India and, as will be discussed later, it is far from the strategic trump card 
for China that many claim it to be.  
 
Indeed, Gwadar has strategic significance in ways that are different from what some 
might assume.  While the new port at Gwadar might have limited military value for 
China, it has considerable military significance for Pakistan.  Pakistan is highly 
dependent on imports for energy and food.  Its main port at Karachi is close to India 
and has shallow approaches and a long channel that could be easily mined.  India used 
this to its advantage during the 1971 Indo-Pak war by blockading Karachi.  The Indian 
Navy also threatened a blockade during the 1999 Kargil conflict which, according to 
some, was an important factor in convincing Pakistan to withdraw its forces from 
Kashmir (Kanwal, 1999, p.220).   The development of Gwadar with links to the rest of 
the country would help provide important strategic depth for Pakistan.  As noted, 
Gwadar could one day also form an important terminus for road, rail and pipelines 
from the Indian Ocean to China and Central Asia.  Although such a prospect seems 
many years off in the current security environment, its potential economic impact is 
significant.   
 
India has responded to the Gwadar project by sponsoring an alternative North-South 
transportation corridor running from the Iranian port of Chahbahar to Afghanistan and 
the Central Asian republics, and to Russia via the Caspian Sea.  India has offered to 
help construct a highway and rail links to Afghanistan (and the Afghani portion of the 
highway has been completed by India’s Border Roads Organisation).   The most 
significant strategic aspect of the project is the development of the port of Chahbahar, 
which is located on the Gulf of Oman, between Gwadar and the Strait of Hormuz.  In 
2012, India signed a trilateral agreement with Iran and Afghanistan under which it 
would contribute $100 million to expand the port, which would then be operated by 
the Indian state-owned Jawaharlal Port Trust. Washington supports the project – the 
need for new transport routes to Afghanistan as an alternative to Pakistan apparently 
overcoming its desire to isolate Iran (Press Trust of India, 2012).  Although unlikely in 
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the current environment, the port could potentially provide the Indian Navy easy 
access to the Strait of Hormuz, which would significantly increase China’s sense of 
strategic vulnerability.  
 
Looking at the Pearls 
 
It is relatively easy to demolish the more unsophisticated claims about the so-called 
‘Pearls.’  Among other things, the ports usually nominated as China’s Pearls seem ill-
suited for use as naval bases.  According to Daniel Kostecka, a China analyst with the 
US Navy, converting Gwadar and Hambantota into naval bases would require billions 
of dollars worth of investment to ensure their viability in wartime and even then, their 
exposed position would make their wartime utility dubious against an enemy equipped 
with long-range precision strike capability (Kostecka, 2010a).  Holmes and Yoshihara, 
senior analysts with the US Naval War College, also conclude that Gwadar is not readily 
defensible and would not prevent the interdiction of Chinese energy supplies inside 
the Persian Gulf (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2008).  As one Chinese analyst commented, 
given the distances separating any Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean, these ports 
look more like ‘sitting ducks’ than a String of Pearls (Ye, 2009). 
 
Other observers such as Robert Kaplan see the ‘String of Pearls’ concept more in terms 
of the development of Chinese strategic influence in the Indian Ocean region rather 
than as immediate plans to establish naval bases.   According to Kaplan, the String of 
Pearls theory describes a commercial, political, strategic and lastly military venture, 
the constituent elements of which cannot be disaggregated.  Kaplan argues that ‘we 
live in a post-modern world of eroding distinctions: a world where coast guards 
sometimes act more aggressively than navies, where sea power is civilian as well as 
military, where access denial can be as relevant as the ability to engage in fleet-on-
fleet battle and where the placement of warships is vital less for sea battles than for 
diplomatic ones’ (Kaplan, 2013). But it is difficult to give much concrete meaning to 
this argument.  While few would doubt that China’s influence in the Indian Ocean 
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region is increasing, it is not clear how this differs from China’s growing economic and 
political influence in many areas of the world. The development of infrastructure in 
several Indian Ocean states must also be seen in the context of Chinese investment in 
port infrastructure in ports as diverse as Los Angeles, Antwerp, Singapore, Piraeus, 
Nigeria, Suez and Djibouti.    
 
Those suspicious of China’s intentions in the Indian Ocean would say that China has 
targeted key states in the northern Indian Ocean that would act as partners in the 
event of military conflict.   If this is part of a concerted strategy then it has not been 
terribly successful.   China appears to be losing considerable strategic influence in 
Myanmar and while Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives have been happy to take 
Chinese investment in infrastructure (and in some cases, Chinese arms), they have also 
been at pains to counter any suggestions of any potential Chinese military presence.   
The only significant exception is Pakistan which, on the contrary, appears to have been 
seeking the development of a Chinese presence as a balance against India and a 
bargaining chip with the United States.     
 
But what then is PLAN’s strategy in the Indian Ocean? Daniel Kostecka argues that 
instead of building ‘Pearls’ the PLAN is instead pursuing a policy of ‘places not bases’ 
allowing PLAN vessels to receive logistical support at ports where China has friendly 
and stable relationships.  He sees this as a natural outgrowth of PLAN’s expanding 
presence in the region, particularly its counter-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa.  
According to Kostecka, PLAN’s logistical support network in the northwestern Indian 
Ocean is likely to include Salalah, Aden, Djibouti (which already provides support for 
the US, French and Japanese navies among others, and is therefore politically safe for 
China), and Karachi (which has substantial repair facilities and possible parts-
commonalities with the Pakistan Navy’s Chinese-built frigates).   In the northeastern 
Indian Ocean, Kostecka believes that PLAN is likely to use Colombo and Singapore 
(both of which are used by many visiting navies).  Although China will maintain positive 
relationships with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives, this does not mean China 
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will seek to establish a military presence in those countries or that such a presence 
would even be permitted as it would undermine those countries’ security and do very 
little to enhance China’s (Kostecka, 2010b).  Indian strategist, Raja Mohan, endorses 
the ‘places not bases’ argument as a realistic basis for assessing China’s plans in the 
Indian Ocean (Mohan, 2012, p.128).   
 
Importantly, the ‘places’ identified by Kostecka (including Singapore, Colombo, Salalah, 
Aden, Djibouti and Port Victoria) are different from the ports the usually appear on the 
list of Chinese ‘Pearls’.  Indeed most of these are located in countries (e.g. Singapore, 
Sri Lanka, Oman and Seychelles) where India holds considerable strategic influence.  
They may be useful logistics nodes for the PLAN in conducting say its anti-piracy 
operations in conjunction with other interested states.  However, none of them would 
appear to be terribly useful in the event of conflict between China and India as it is 
difficult to imagine these countries wishing to publicly side with China in those 
circumstances.   In this respect, even the idea of PLAN ‘places’ in the Indian Ocean 
might not have a great deal of meaning.   In short, the popularity of the ‘String of 
Pearls’ narrative among the Indian security community may say more about Indian 
insecurities than actual Chinese strategic intentions.    
 
A Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean? 
 
Is there a Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean?  As Mohan Malik 
colourfully describes it, ‘Just as the Indian sub-continental plate has a tendency to 
constantly rub and push against the Eurasian tectonic plate, causing friction and 
volatility in the entire Himalayan mountain range, India’s bilateral relationship with 
China also remains volatile, friction- and tension-ridden’ (Malik, 2011, p.9).  There are 
many unresolved issues between them, including a major border dispute in the 
Himalayas, Tibetan autonomy, China’s de facto alliance with Pakistan and its 
relationships elsewhere in South Asia.  Probably most infuriating of all for New Delhi is 
China’s refusal to recognise India’s claims to great power status.  Some observers see a 
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material deterioration in the Sino-Indian strategic relationship in recent years, 
propelling the countries towards a wider strategic rivalry.  Concerns about China 
appear to be broadly held by the Indian public. According to a 2013 opinion poll, some 
82% of Indians considered China to be a threat to the security of India in the next 10 
years (Medcalf, 2013, p.10).    
  
Underlying competition in the Indian Ocean is Beijing’s opposition to India’s strategic 
aspirations to become the leading power in the region.  As General Zhao Nanqi, 
Director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, commented, ‘we are not 
prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India’s Ocean’ (Hindustan Times, 1993).  
Many Chinese analysts argue that in coming years a ‘Great Game’ will be played out 
between China and India in the Indian Ocean, frequently (if inaccurately) quoting US 
sea power theorist Alfred Mahan as stating, ‘Whoever controls the Indian Ocean 
dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the Seven Seas’ (Yoshihara, 2012).  The 
Chinese commentariat, at least, appears to see significant potential for struggle over 
control of the Indian Ocean. 
 
These feelings are reciprocated. While the Indian Navy’s immediate objectives in the 
Indian Ocean involve countering Pakistan, enforcing control over India’s exclusive 
economic zone, and protection of trade, the potential for China to project naval power 
into the Indian Ocean has become its principal long-term source of concern.  Many in 
New Delhi see a significant risk that India and China will, as Arun Prakash, Indian Chief 
of Naval Staff (2004-2006), put it, ‘compete and even clash for the same strategic 
space’ (Prakash, 2007, p.99).  As Prakash’s successor, Admiral Suresh Mehta, claimed 
on Indian television: 
 
[China] is shaping the maritime battlefield in the region.  It is making friends in 
the right places. It you don’t have the capability to operate in these waters, for 
a length of time, then you need friends who will support your cause, when the 
time comes, so definitely China is doing that, as there are Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
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Myanmar, Sri Lanka and down below Africa. So it is a known fact that we are 
ringed by states which may have a favourable disposition towards China (NDTV 
India, 2007). 
 
Sino-Indian competition has the potential to spread beyond the Indian Ocean to the 
Pacific.  India has responded to China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean by 
developing its own presence near the Malacca Strait.  It has also tried to exert pressure 
on China to keep off its ‘patch’ by improving relations with Vietnam, which has led to 
speculation that India intends to establish a naval base in Vietnam as a tit for tat for 
Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean  
 
Based on the categorisations used by Robert Jervis in understanding the security 
dilemma, one could conclude that the strategic environment in the Indian Ocean is 
‘doubly dangerous’ and that there is considerable scope for an intense security 
dilemma between India and China.   If the protection of trade and sea lines of 
communication  is ranked as a primary maritime security concern in the Indian Ocean, 
then offensive and defensive naval build ups for this purpose could be difficult to 
distinguish.  There is considerable overlap between the capabilities a state would 
require to protect its own maritime trade and the capabilities required to interdict 
another state’s trade.  In addition, given the disparity between the resources required 
to defend a commercial ship from interdiction as against the resources required to 
interdict that ship, one could argue that offensive behaviour in this respect has a 
considerable advantage over defensive behaviour.  Arguably the behaviour of both 
India and China indicates an intense security dilemma as each takes actions at the 
expense of the other.  Indeed, both states seem to be undertaking major naval build-
ups with an emphasis on ‘blue water’ capabilities.  India is aligning itself with the 
United States, apparently to balance against a stronger China, and is developing its 
capabilities at or around the choke points where it could most easily interdict Chinese 
vessels.  The String of Pearls narrative also seems to be proof that China is preparing 
the ground for a naval build-up in the Indian Ocean.  Even analysts such as Raja 
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Mohan, who reject the cruder versions of the String of Pearls theory, see a security 
dilemma existing between India and China in their overall relationship (Mohan, 2012, 
p.190). 
 
But any analysis of Sino-Indian strategic competition also needs to take into account 
factors that cast considerable doubt on the value of understanding the relationship, at 
least in the Indian Ocean, through the lens of the security dilemma.  First, the Indian 
Ocean is but one theatre of strategic interaction between India and China and it should 
probably be regarded a secondary theatre or dimension.  Of greater significance is 
India’s overwhelming geo-strategic advantage over China in the Indian Ocean.  Indeed, 
unlike other areas of strategic competition, the Indian Ocean is the one area in which 
India holds a clear military advantage over China.  As Admiral Mehta commented, ‘The 
weak area for China today is the Indian Navy. We sit in the Indian Ocean and that is a 
concern for China and they are not happy as it is not so easy for them to come inside’ 
(Zeenews.com, 2009).  This is largely the result of geography.  In strategic jargon, the 
Indian Ocean represents ‘exterior lines’ for China and ‘interior lines’ for India.  That is, 
India has a natural advantage in the Indian Ocean, including short lines of 
communication to its own bases and resources, and China has corresponding 
disadvantages (Holmes, 2012).  The proximity of maritime chokepoints around the 
Indian Ocean to Indian territory or facilities provide another major advantage for India 
that is difficult for China to counter.  Indeed, it is difficult to see China ever being in a 
position to militarily defend the entirety of its SLOCs that run from the Strait of 
Hormuz around the Indian subcontinent and through the Malacca Strait.   One should 
remember that from China’s standpoint there is little value in having the capability of 
defending only a portion of the SLOCs – to reduce its vulnerability China must be 
capable of defending the SLOCs in their entirety against both state and non-state 
actors.    
 
China’s military options in the Indian Ocean are in fact very limited.  Neither putative 
‘Pearls’ such as Gwadar or Hambantota nor overland pipelines would do much to 
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affect the overwhelming balance in India’s favour.  Even a Chinese naval presence at 
Gwadar would seem to have limited offensive value.  Could the PLAN realistically 
enforce some form of blockade of the Strait of Hormuz without the active participation 
of neighbouring states?  Even if a blockade could be enforced, is it realistic to conceive 
that Chinese oil would be allowed to sail unhindered past India and through the 
Malacca Strait?  Any Chinese blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would be merely cutting 
its own throat.  It might be more useful to see a Chinese military presence at Gwadar, 
if it ever came to pass, as a defensive move by China. 
 
Alternatively Beijing might be tempted to try to overcome China’s strategic 
disadvantages through brute force.   This could theoretically include building China’s 
power projection capabilities so that it is able to match and surpass India’s capabilities 
on its home turf; and using China’s economic strength to suborn Indian Ocean states to 
support China’s power in the Indian Ocean region.  Whether or not this would be 
achievable, it would likely involve the diversion of substantial resources away from the 
western Pacific and seems unlikely before the status of Taiwan is resolved to China’s 
satisfaction.    
 
Another, more realistic, strategy would be for Beijing to minimise provocation of India 
in the Indian Ocean and employ its resources elsewhere where it possesses the 
strategic advantage.  If China is not ultimately able to protect its Indian Ocean SLOCs 
from India then it would be better to act cautiously in that theatre, building its 
capabilities and relationships there slowly.  This could potentially include developing 
political and economic influence to encourage India’s putative partners in the region to 
remain neutral.  For example, India’s attempt in 2007 to establish a signals intelligence 
facility in northern Madagascar was rumoured to have been stymied by Chinese 
lobbying.5  Even India’s close partners in the Indian Ocean, such as Maldives and 
Mauritius, could become more cautious about their security links with India as their 
economic relationships with China grow.   Despite occasional provocations to the 
contrary (e.g. a brief and essentially pointless naval exercise by the PLAN in the eastern 
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Indian Ocean in January 2014), China appears to be taking this tentative and cautious 
approach to any security presence in the Indian Ocean. 
 
India also faces some difficult choices. It could choose to work with the United States 
and its allies to leverage China’s strategic vulnerability.  This could act as restraint on 
China’s strategic behaviour elsewhere but could also easily lead to instability and 
strategic rivalry in the Indian Ocean.   However, such a strategy may be relatively high 
risk and it may make greater sense for India not to play that card.  Indeed, New Delhi 
has more often than not sought to hose down discussions of rivalry or the existence of 
a security dilemma.  Shiv Shankar Menon, the Indian National Security Advisor, 
commented that he regretted that debate on the Indian Ocean was being ‘framed 
solely in terms of a Sino-Indian rivalry.  This is especially true of strategists in India and 
China themselves, though not their governments. The terms in which the argument is 
presented is limited and would be self-fulfilling predictions, were governments to act 
upon them. Nor are they based on an examination of the objective interests of the 
states concerned’ (Menon, 2009).   According to Menon, Delhi and Beijing will be able 
to rise above the rhetoric and keep strategic competition under control.    
 
The real challenge for India may be how to maintain its overwhelming geographic 
advantage in the Indian Ocean without unnecessarily provoking China to take actions 
that would be to India’s detriment.  India should want to maintain its strategic trump 
card against China’s SLOCs at the least possible cost.  This was recognized long ago by 
the father of Indian maritime strategy, K.M.Panikkar, who suggested that Rangoon 
should be turned by international treaty into a ‘free port’ that would give China a 
trading outlet on the Indian Ocean and alleviate its fears of blockade of its Pacific ports 
(Panikkar, 1943, p.103).   
 
Framing the analysis beyond the box of the security dilemma has considerable 
consequences for our understanding of the strategic relationship in the maritime 
realm. Despite much talk from the nationalist commentariats, in reality both India and 
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China have been cautious about developing any significant naval presence in each 
other’s primary maritime sphere.  Each has largely resisted attempts by partners such 
as Pakistan and Vietnam to draw them into disputes with their neighbours.  China has 
been careful not to establish any significant military presence in the Indian Ocean 
beyond the anti-piracy deployment.  Similarly, despite some talk, India has not 
established such a presence in the Western Pacific and according to Indian Naval Chief 
of Staff such a deployment is not on the cards (India Today, 2012).  An understanding 
between China and India not to develop a permanent presence on each other’s ‘patch’ 
may be helpful in reducing tensions.  However, given the broader context of Sino-
Indian strategic rivalry, it seems unlikely that China would be prepared to rely on India 
for its maritime security needs in the Indian Ocean region in the absence of a broader 
strategic understanding.    
 
The larger issue is whether India and China can work together to help manage the 
complicated regional security environment in Asia.  This would include finding ways to 
accommodate the legitimate interests of all powers and facilitating the development 
of China’s role as a legitimate and responsible stakeholder in Indian Ocean security.  
There have been tentative suggestions from both Indian and Chinese sources about 
the desirability of reaching an understanding of their respective roles in the Indian 
Ocean.   In 2009, Shiv Shankar Menon, proposed a cooperative security arrangement 
among major Asian powers (including the United States), that would encompass the 
Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific (Menon, 2009).  As Menon later commented, for 
such a system to work, India, China and other rising Asian powers must be willing and 
capable of contributing to global public goods (Menon, 2010).  India will also expect 
China to acknowledge India’s special role in the Indian Ocean, if not perhaps that it is 
an ‘Indian Lake’.  Whether this can be achieved is a big question.  But while the Sino-
Indian relationship remains unstable, there are good reasons for both Beijing and Delhi 
to keep strategic competition in the Indian Ocean under control. 
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1 This view was echoed by Indian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sureesh Mehta (Indian 
Navy, 2007). 
2 The term was first used in a 2005 report titled ‘Energy Futures in Asia’ prepared for 
the US Secretary of Defence by the private consultants, Booz-Allen-Hamilton and was 
quickly adopted by Indian analysts. 
3 The Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa also reportedly approached the United States 
several times to fund the project (Samaranayake, 2011, p.27). 
4 There are unsubstantiated claims that China has established a signals intelligence 
facility at Gwadar (The Times of India, 2002). 
5 Confidential interview with the author.  Mauritius, May 2013. 
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